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COLLAPSIBLE CORPORATIONS
Zolman Cavitch
The collapsible corporation section' first came into the Internal Rev-
enue Code in 1950 as a loophole-plugging law. The loophole aimed
at was one which was then prevalent primarily in the movie and real
estate industries and enabled the tax-sophisticated businessman to convert
ordinary income into favorably taxed long-term capital gain.
The problem and the solution can be illustrated by the following
example. Suppose that an individual owned a large tract of raw land
which he wished to subdivide, improve, and sell as residential sites. If
he proceeded without incorporating, the entire profit would constitute or-
dinary income. Similarly, if he formed a corporation to proceed with
the project, and the corporation sold the lots, its profit would be taxed
as ordinary income and, in addition, the after-tax profit would still be in
the corporate till, normally requiring the payment of a second tax at the
shareholder level in order to place those profits in the shareholder's
pocket. Neither of these alternatives was ideal, to say the least.
Prior to 1950, there was a way out. The landowner could transfer
his land to a newly-formed corporation, have the corporation subdivide
and improve the land, and then, prior to the sale of the lots, cause the
corporation to liquidate. The shareholder would pay a long-term capital
gain tax based on the difference between the cost of his shares and the
value of the assets received2 - a maximum tax of twenty-five per cent -
and the corollary would be that the shareholder would have a cost basis
for the lots equal to their fair market value at the time of liquidation.8
Upon a subsequent sale of the lots by the erstwhile shareholder, that
excess would escape any further tax; it would have been converted from
potential ordinary income to the corporation to long-term capital gain to
the shareholder.
This loophole is now largely blocked by section 341. A shareholder
who receives a liquidating or other distribution from a collapsible corpora-
tion, which distribution would otherwise give rise to long-term capital
gain, may be taxed at ordinary income tax rates.4 Indeed, he will be so
1. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 341 [hereinafter cited as CODE Q].
2. CODE § 331.
3. CODE 5 334(a).
4. CODE 5 341 (a). The collapsible corporation provisions apply not only to corporate dis-
tributions which would otherwise give rise to long-term capital gain to the distributees, but
to shareholder sales of stock as well. References throughout this article to "collapsing the
corporation" should be read to mean distributions from the corporation and sales of shares.
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taxed unless he fits into one of the several exceptions to which we shall
make brief mention a little later.5
DEFINITION OF A COLLAPSIBLE CORPORATION
The least understood aspect of collapsible corporations, which in-
volves the most difficult statutory phraseology and is the occasion for the
largest number of decided collapsible cases, is the definition of a col-
lapsible corporation. It is with this definition that we shall be primarily
concerned.
A collapsible corporation is defined as
... a corporation formed or availed of principally for the manufacture,
construction, or production of property, for the purchase of... [§341
assets], with a view to -(A) the sale or exchange of stock by its shareholders (whether in
liquidation or otherwise) ... before the realization by the
corporation manufacturing, constructing, producing, or purchas-
ing the property of a substantial part of the taxable income to be
derived from such property, and
(B) the realization by such shareholders of gain attributable to such
property.
Unfortunately, the definition is even more complex than it appears. Let
us examine that definition in detail, stopping at each key phrase.
r, ..formed or availed of..."
The corporation may be formed or availed of for the proscribed pur-
pose. The disjunctive is meaningful.! We tend to think of a collapsible
corporation as one which is relatively new, one which has not received
a significant amount of taxable income. That will normally be true, but
it is not necessarily true. An old corporation - one which has operated
profitably for fifty years or more - can be availed of for the proscribed
purpose and land the shareholders in tax trouble. This problem will be
discussed in more detail after we have examined the relevant key phrases.
". ..principally. .."
A collapsible corporation must be formed or availed of principally for
the manufacture, production, etc. of property. The word "principally"
modifies "manufacture, production, etc." and not "with a view to." One
5. See text beginning at page 285, infra. In addition to the possibility of an unfavorable
tax to the shareholders, if a corporation is collapsible the elective tax treatment of the so-called
"one-month liquidation" will not be available (see CODE § 333 (a) and Treas. Reg. § 1.333-
1 (a) (1955) [hereinafter cited as Reg. fl), and the nonrecognition provisions of section 337
of the Code will not be applicable (See CODE § 337 (c) (1) (A) and Rev. Rul. 58-241, 1958-1
CUm. BuLL 179).
6. CODE § 341(b) (1).
7. See Maxwell Temkin, 35 T.C. No. 101 (March 13, 1961).
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hard-pressed taxpayer attempted to squirm out of a collapsible penalty
by arguing that his corporation was formed or availed of principally to
make money, not principally to obtain an income tax advantage. But
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reminded him that he had
missed the whole point.8 The view to collapse the corporation need not
be the principal purpose for the formation or availing of the corporation.
"Principally" defines "manufacture, etc." and is therefore of little or no
help in attempting to avoid collapsible status.
... manufacture, construction, or production of property..
The "manufacture, construction, or production of property" has been
broadly defined both by the courts and the Internal Revenue Service.
An attempt to get out from under collapsible treatment on the ground
that the corporation was collapsed too early in the game, before the
manufacure, construction, or production began, must face the obstacle of
a strict interpretation. Any integral step in the construction process will
be considered construction. For example, the mere rezoning of land
from residential to commercial has been ruled to be construction." The
preparation of preliminary architect's drawings is probably construction.1
The obtaining of long-term leases, even before any other work is done in
the construction of a shopping center or an office building, would proba-
bly be considered construction for this purpose.
Furthermore, the corporation will be deemed to have engaged in
construction if someone else does construction work and then transfers
the property to the corporation in a tax-free exchange. " Similarly, if
the corporation constructed property and then exchanged that con-
structed property for other property in a tax-free exchange, the corpora-
tion will be deemed to have constructed the property so acquired, even
if the corporation did not in fact lift a finger with respect to the acquired
property."3
"Section 341 assets"
As indicated in the immediately preceding paragraphs, a corporation
may be collapsible if it manufactures, constructs, or produces any kind
of property. In addition, a corporation may be collapsible if it purchases
8. Weil v. Commissioner, 252 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1958).
9. Abbott v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 537 (3d Cir. 1958); Ellsworth J. Sterner, 32 T.C.
1144 (1959); Rev. Rul. 57-346, 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 236; Rev. Rul. 56-137, 1956-1 CuM.
BULL. 178.
10. Rev. Rul. 56-137, 1956-1 CUM. BULL. 178.
11. See Ellsworth J. Sterner, 32 T.C. 1144 (1959); Jack Faber, 36 T.C. 116 (1961).
12. CODE § 341(b) (2) (B); Reg. § 1.341-2(a) (5) (1955).
13. CODE § 341(b) (2) (C); Reg. § 1.341-2 (a) (5) (1955).
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property defined as "section 341 assets." "Section 341 assets" are de-
fined in detail in the Code.14 Very generally speaking, such assets are
assets held for less than three years which are inventory or inventory-like
property, property held for rental, or receivables acquired by virtue of
the sale of the foregoing types of property.
"... with a view to
Statutory language which purports to define a subjective state of mind
is always troublesome. It is therefore not surprising that a great bulk
of collapsible litigation to date has centered on the meaning of the phrase
"with a view to."' 5 A collapsible corporation must be formed or availed
of principally for the manufacture, etc. of property with a view to collap-
sing the corporation prior to the realization of corporate profits.
The still-unsettled question is: When must that view to collapse first
come into existence in order for the corporation to be collapsible?
Various answers are possible. The answer most favorable to tax-
payers, and the one which most easily follows the statutory language, is
that the view to collapse must arise at some time during the construction
process. Suppose, for example, that a corporation were formed for the
construction and leasing of a shopping center. After construction was
completed, the shareholders decided for the first time that the corpora-
tion should be liquidated, or that its shares should be sold. Accordingly,
the corporation is collapsed and the shareholders realize a substantial
gain. Under this favorable interpretation of the statute, the corporation
would not be collapsible even though all of the other elements of col-
lapsibility might be present. It would not be collapsible because the
view to collapse did not exist at any time during the construction process.
The requirement that the view to collapse exist at some time during
the construction, etc. process seems to be the proper interpretation of
the statute."8 Indeed, even the Treasury Department, in a diluted fashion,
acknowledges this in its Regulations. The Regulations state that if the
view to collapse is attributable solely to circumstances which arose after
the construction, the corporation will ordinarily be considered noncollaps-
ible.'7
14. CODB§ 5341(b) (3).
15. Jacobson v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 703 (3d Cir. 1960); Spangler v. Commissioner,
278 F.2d 665 (4th Cir. 1960); Sidney v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1960);
Payne v. Commissioner, 268 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1959); August v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d
829 (3d Cir. 1959); Glickman v. Commissioner, 256 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1958); Burge v.
Commissioner, 253 F.2d 765 (4th Cir. 1958); Charles J. Riley, 35 T.C. No. 95 (February
28, 1961), appeal filed, 1st Cir., July 19, 1961; Benjamin Braunstein, 36 T.C. No. 3 (April 11,
1961); Maxwell Temkin, 35 T.C. No. 101 (March 13, 1961); Ellsworth J. Sterner, 32 T.C.
1144 (1959); Max Mintz, 32 T.C. 723 (1959).
16. Jacobson v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 703 (3rd Cir. 1960); Charles J. Riley, 35 T.C. No.
95 (February 28, 1961); Maxwell Temkin, 35 T.C. No. 101 (March 31, 1961).
17. Reg. § 1.341-2(a) (3) (1955).
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It might be supposed that the Treasury's acceptance of this interpre-
tation would put an end to the matter. No such luck. Two courts of
appeal, the highly respected Second Circuit and the Fourth Circuit, plus
five of the judges of the Tax Court, appear to be upset over the reason-
ableness of the Treasury Department's interpretation.'" In dicta written
by both courts and by the five minority judges of the Tax Court, the
unusual position is advanced that the Treasury Department has in this
respect been unwarrantedly generous to taxpayers. These authorities take
the position that the "view to" language in the statute does not modify
the language which precedes it. Rather, it is simply introductory to the
language which follows it; that, in effect, when a corporation is collapsed
there must of necessity be a view to collapse it and that therefore the
"view to" language is always satisfied whether the intention arose during
the construction process or after it. This is, of course, an unfavorable
interpretation since it reads out altogether any limiting significance to the
"view to" language. Under this interpretation the "view to" requirement
will always be met.
The debate still rages; the last word has not yet been written by the
courts. As a practical planning matter, however, the possibility that there
may be a favorable answer to the "view to" debate will give little com-
fort. Even under the liberal interpretation, the Treasury Department im-
poses, and the courts enforce, a difficult burden on the taxpayers to prove
a complete absence, during the construction process, of any intention to
collapse. 9 If the intention to collapse exists at any time during the
construction process, unconditionally, conditionally, or as a recognized
possibility, the "view to" requirement will be met. Indeed, if merely the
circumstances giving rise to the view were present during construction,
or could reasonably be anticipated during the construction, the view would
be deemed to exist.2" Only in those rare instances where it can be shown
that no view to collapse existed at all during construction, that wholly un-
anticipated circumstances arose after the construction was complete, and
that the intent to collapse was motivated solely by these subsequent circum-
stances, will the corporation be noncollapsible on this account.2 ' But this
18. Sidney v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1960); Glickman v. Commissioner,
256 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1958); Burge v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 765 (4th Cir. 1958);
Maxwell Temkin, 35 T.C. No. 101 (March 13, 1961) (dissenting opinion); Charles J.
Riley, 35 T.C. No. 95 (February 28, 1961) (dissenting opinion).
19. Reg. 5 1.341-2(a) (2), (3) (1955); Spangler v. Commissioner, 278 F.2d 665 (4th
Cir. 1960); Payne v. Commissioner, 268 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1959); August v. Commissioner,
267 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1959); Benjamin Braunstein, 36 T.C. No. 3 (April 11, 1961); Ells-
worth J. Sterner, 32 T.C. 1144 (1959); Max Mintz, 32 T.C. 723 (1959).
20. See Ellsworth J. Sterner, 32 T.C. 1144 (1959); Max Mintz, 32 T.C. 723 (1959).
21. Reg. § 1.341-5(c) Example (3) (1955). If the view to collapse arises during con-
struction, or is deemed to have arisen during construction, it is immaterial that it was mod-
vated by a compelling business reason rather than by a tax avoidance purpose. Ellsworth J.
Sterner, 32 T.C. 1144 (1959).
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burden of proof can sometimes be met, as witness a few taxpayer victories
in court on this issue.' There is therefore reason to hope that the
proper interpretation of the "view to" language will be the one which
ultimately prevails.
.. . substantial part of the taxable income
to be derived from such property..."
A fundamental requirement of collapsibility is that the corporation
must be collapsed prior to the realization by the corporation of a sub-
stantial part of the taxable income to be derived from the property manu-
factured, constructed, etc. Here again the courts are not in agreement;
how is "substantial part" measured and how much is "substantial"? Let
us start with an example. Suppose that a corporation is formed - or
availed of - to construct a twenty-house residential development. The
twenty houses are built and the corporation actually begins to sell them.
Eight houses are sold by the corporation for a net profit of $3,000 per
house, or $24,000 of corporate profit. Then, before the twelve remain-
ing houses are sold, the corporation liquidates and the shareholders take
over these twelve houses at their estimated fair market value. Did the
corporation, prior to the liquidation, realize a substantial part of the
taxable income when it realized 8/20ths, or forty per cent of the total
anticipated profit? The majority of the Tax Court and the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit would say "yes."2  One-third of the total
anticipated profit is substantial! 4
But the Treasury Regulations and, apparently, the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit would say that a substantial part has not been
realized until the unrealized profit is insubstantial!' In other words,
these authorities would look to the quantity of the unsold houses in our
example. Since sixty per cent of the houses had not been sold by the
corporation, and presumably sixty per cent of the profits had not been
realized, the substantial part requirement had not been met.
This latter, unfavorable interpretation seems dearly to be an un-
justified reading of the statute. Its justification, to the judges who ad-
vance it, and presumably to the Treasury Department, is that unless the
statute is so interpreted, the loophole at which the statute is aimed still
remains two-thirds open. This is undeniably true, but the complete an-
swer ought to be that Congress left the loophole open to that extent and
it is up to Congress, if it sees fit, to close it.
22. Jacobson v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 703 (3d Cir. 1960); Charles J. Riley, 35 T.C.
No. 95 (February 28, 1961); Maxwell Temkin, 35 T.C. No. 101 (March 13, 1961).
23. Commissioner v. Kelley, 293 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1961), affirming 32 T.C. 135 (1959).
See also Levenson v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 244 (N.D. Ala. 1957).
24. Commissioner v. Kelley, 293 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1961).
25. Reg. § 1.341-5(c) (2) (1955); Abbott v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 537 (3d Cir. 1958).
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At any rate, the chances are that the proper interpretation will pre-
vail and if the corporation has realized a substantial part of the taxable
income to be derived from the particular project or building, the corpora-
tion will not be collapsible. It appears, furthermore, that one-third will
be the dividing line; anything less than that will not be substantial.'
Some nice questions are presented as to the proper method for com-
puting the amount of the total income to be derived from the property
- problems which, by virtue of space limitations, must be glossed over.27
It might be well to emphasize, however, that an argument by the tax-
payer that a substantial part has already been realized because business is
not likely to be good in the future will not be persuasive unless the tax-
payer can document his case, a fairly unlikely possibility. In brief,
several courts have announced that they will not speculate pessimistically
over the likelihood or unlikelihood of future profits.2
".... gain attributable to such property."
To fall within the collapsible proscription, a shareholder must realize
gain which is attributable to the property manufactured, constructed, etc.
by the corporation. The early litigation in the collapsible area centered
largely around the taxpayer's contention that his gain was not attributable
to property constructed by the corporation.29 Many of these cases were
so-called "excess mortgage" cases. For example, a corporation would be
formed to build an apartment project to be financed by an FHA-insured
mortgage. The shareholders would put in little or nothing. Appar-
ently, it was not unusual in the immediate post-war years for builders to
obtain FHA commitments substantially in excess of construction cost. In
these instances, when the project was completed or substantially com-
pleted, and before the corporation had any earnings, the excess mortgage
proceeds would be distributed out to the shareholders. That corporate
distribution, to the extent it exceeded the shareholders' basis for their
shares, would normally be taxed as long-term gain.8" The Commissioner
argued, however, that the collapsible provision applied to make the gain
taxable as ordinary income. The issue in most of these cases was whether
the gain was attributable to property constructed by the corporation.
26. Compare Heft v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1961), where the same court
which decided the Kelley case held that one eighth of the total profits was -not substantial.
27. Note the different approach taken in Abbott v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 537 (3d cir.
1958) from that taken in James B. Kelley, 32 T.C. 135 (1959), affd, 293 F.2d 904 (5th
Cir. 1961); Levenson v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 244 (N.D. Ala. 1957); Frank B. Short,
35 T.C. No. 103 (March 14, 1961).
28. Spangler v. Commissioner, 278 F.2d 665 (4th Cir. 1960); Payne v. Commissioner, 268
F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1959); Max Mintz, 32 T.C. 723 (1959).
29. Payne v. Commissioner, 268 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1959); Burge v. Commissioner, 253
F.2d 765 (4th Cir. 1958); Frank B. Short, 35 T.C. No. 103 (March 14, 1961).
30. CODE § 301(c) (3) (A).
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The Government invariably won these "excess mortgage" cases and
in the process it has been pretty well established that the phrase "gain
attributable to such property" is to be broadly construed. If the gain
would not have been realized by the shareholders but for the manu-
facture, construction, etc. by the corporation, then the gain is virtually
certain to be attributable to the property so constructed."'
Statutory Presumption of Collapsibility
Since 1954 the collapsible section of the Code has contained a pro-
vision creating, in certain defined instances, a rebuttable presumption that
the corporation meets the definition of a collapsible corporation."2 This
presumption applies if, at the time the corporation is collapsed, the fair
market value of its section 341 assets"3 is (1) fifty per cent or more of the
fair market value of its total assets,34 and (2) 120 per cent or more of the
adjusted basis of such section 341 assets. To date there have been no
reported cases relying on or interpreting this statutory presumption. In
view of the difficult burden of proof imposed by the courts upon tax-
payers who are trying to prove the noncollapsibility of their corporations,
it is not likely that this statutory presumption will add greatly to tax-
payers' woes.
LIMITATIONS ON ADVERSE COLLAPSIBLE TREATMENT
The second matter of fundamental importance in working with the
collapsible rules is that there are certain statutory exceptions to collapsible
treatment even though the corporation may admittedly be collapsible.
That is, even though the definition of a collapsible corporation is dearly
satisfied, the gain realized by a shareholder will not be converted from
long-term capital gain to ordinary income if one of the statutory excep-
tions applies.35 In many cases involving the dosely-held corporation,
there will be reasonable assurance, for planning purposes, that the col-
lapsible penalty will not apply only if one of these statutory exceptions
is applicable.
31. See in addition to the cases cited in footnote 29 supra, Paul Braude, 35 T.C. No. 121
(March 31, 1961); Erwin Gerber, 32 T.C. 1199 (1959).
32. CoDE S 341(c).
33. See text beginning atp. 280 sura.
34. For this purpose "total assets" does not include the corporation's cash, obligations which
are capital assets to the corporation, most government obligations even though not capital
assets, and stock in other corporations. CoDE § 341(c) (2).
35. But, the corporation being collapsible under the statutory definition, the nonrecognition
provisions of section 337 will not be applicable, and the elective tax treatment of the so-called
"one-month liquidation" may not be available. See note 5 supra.
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Three-year Limitation
Even though the corporation may be admittedly collapsible, the
penalty will not apply on a shareholder sale or corporate liquidation if
the sale or liquidation occurs more than three years after completion of
the manufacture, construction, etc. of the property.3 6 For this purpose,
the Treasury Department takes the position that the three-year period
does not begin to run until the particular property or project is completely
finished; substantial completion is not enough in the view of the Treas-
ury Department." The courts are somewhat equivocal on this point,
but apparently will support the Treasury.3
In many instances, this exception will be an important planning tool.
The liquidation or sale of shares of a corporation owning a shopping
center or office building, or apartment project, may in some instances
conveniently be postponed for a time until the three-year period has run.
This alternative is not likely to be feasible in the case of a corporation
which owns a residential subdivision ready for sale.
The "Subsection (e)" Limitation
A second exception to collapsible treatment is couched in statutory
terms which clearly take top prize for obscurity of meaning." No at-
tempt will be made in this paper to unravel the garbled language of this
relatively new limitation.4" It will suffice for present purposes to state
simply that the section applies if the unrealized appreciation in corporate
assets which could be sold by the corporation or by certain shareholders
only as ordinary income items does not exceed fifteen per cent of the
corporation's total net worth, as adjusted in various ways. In working
with this limitation it is essential to have the precise facts and figures of
a given situation and to analyze them in terms of each phrase of this
difficult provision.
The "5 % shareholder" Limitation
A third exception to collapsible treatment applies if a shareholder
realizing the gain did not, at any time during the construction process or
36. CoDE § 341(d) (3). The period of a predecessor's ownership is tacked on if the cor-
poration acquired the property in a wholly or partly tax-free transaction. Rev. Rul. 57-491,
1957-2 CuM. BULL. 232.
37. Reg. 5 1.341-4(d) (1955); Rev. Rul. 56-137, 1956-1 CuM. BULL. 178.
38. Glickman v. Commissioner, 256 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1958); Ellsworth J. Sterner, 32
T.C. 1144 (1959). But cf. Maxwell Temkin, 35 T.C. No. 101 (March 13, 1961), where,
in holding that the view to collapse did not arise during construction, the Tax Court ignored
the fact (or deemed it insignificant) that the lawn and landscaping were not completed until
after the view arose.
39. CoDE 5 341(e).
40. For a more detailed treatment of this limitation, see Modrall, Collapsible Corporations
and Subsection (e), 37 TAxEs 895 (1959).
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thereafter, own more than five per cent in value of the corporation's
stock, provided further that during such time none of his stock was at-
tributable to a more-than-five per cent shareholder.!1 Both in testing the
five per cent ownership and in determining whether any of a share-
holder's stock is attributable to another, very broad attribution of owner-
ship rules apply.4
This stock ownership limitation will rarely be helpful with respect to
the closely-held corporation. It suggests, however, a possible escape from
collapsible treatment if the collapsible corporation can be disposed of by
way of a tax-free reorganization. That is, if the stock or assets of a col-
lapsible corporation are exchanged for stock of a publicly-held corporation
in a transaction which is completely tax-free,4" there can be no collapsible
tax treatment by virtue of that exchange. Thereafter, if the shareholder
does not own, after the application of attribution rules, more than five
per cent of the publicly-held corporation's stock, he will be able to dispose
of such stock free of collapsible worries.44
The '709%-30%" Limitation
A fourth, and important, exception requires a little explanation. No
matter how collapsible the corporation may be, a particular shareholder
will not be penalized at all unless more than seventy per cent of his gain
is attributable to the assets which have made the corporation collapsible.45
An example will be helpful. Suppose that X Corporation has been in
existence for thirty years. For the first twenty-nine years it was engaged
in a retail grocery business and did quite well, having accumulated a sub-
stantial amount of earned surplus. One year ago it invested a portion of
its resources in the construction of a shopping center and before the con-
struction was complete, it became obvious that the shopping center was
worth a great deal more than it cost X Corporation to construct. The
shareholders decide to sell their stock. There are two equal shareholders,
A and B. A was one of the founders of the corporation; the cost basis
for his shares is only $10,000. B purchased his shares one year ago, just
before the shopping center construction commenced, and he paid $200,000
for his shares. A and B each realize $300,000 for his shares and each
would have realized $200,000 if the shopping center had never been
constructed. On these facts shareholder A would realize a total profit of
41. CODE5 341(d) (1).
42. Thus, for example, attribution of ownership applies for this purpose between brothers-
in-law and sisters-in-law, as well as between various other relatives by blood and marriage.
43. See COD13 §§ 354(a), 368(a) (1) (A)-(C).
44. Also, it may be possible to conclude with reasonable assurance that the publicly-held
corporation is not collapsible in the first instance, in which event it would be unnecessary to
meet one of the limitations in order to escape collapsible tax treatment.
45. CODE § 341(d) (2).
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$290,000, but only $100,000 of that profit is attributable to the collapsi-
ble property. Since the portion of his gain which is attributable to col-
lapsible assets is less than seventy per cent, no part of his profit will be
ordinary income. By contrast, shareholder B realizes a profit of $100,000
and all of it is attributable to the collapsible property. All of his profit
will be ordinary income.
The point is that this seventy per cent test is applied to each share-
holder separately and it requires a computation of the percentage of his
profit which is attributable to the collapsible assets - that is, a computa-
tion based upon the difference between the profit he actually realized and
what would have been realized by him if the corporation had not manu-
factured, constructed, etc. the relevant collapsible property.
The applicability of this seventy per cent test should be contrasted in
one important respect with the "substantial part" portion of the collapsi-
ble definition. If, as is fairly likely, the "substantial pare' requirement of
collapsibility is met when at least one-third of the anticipated profit is
realized by the corporation, the corporation will be noncollapsible if at
least one-third of the profit anticipated from the particular project as to
which the requisite view exists has been realized by the corporation.4
Corporate profits previously realized from completed projects as to which
no view to collapse was present are of no consequence for this purpose.
Suppose, for example, that a corporation has $1,000,000 of earned sur-
plus. It embarks upon an entirely new project, the construction and sale
of houses, upon which the entire profit will be $100,000. Prior to the
completion of the project, the shareholders decide to collapse the corpora-
tion. At the time when the corporation is collapsed, it has already
realized $20,000 of the anticipated $100,000 profits. The corporation
will probably be collapsible notwithstanding that the corporation's total
earned surplus at the time it is collapsed is $1,020,000 and its unrealized
profit is only $80,000. The relevant fact for this purpose is that with
respect to the collapsible property (the property as to which the requisite
view exists), only twenty per cent of the profit has been realized by the
corporation.'
By contrast, some or all of the shareholders may be free of the col-
lapsible penalty by virtue of the seventy per cent limitation even though
the corporation is collapsible. In applying the seventy per cent limitation,
only the shareholder gain which is attributable to noncollapsible property
is helpful. Not only does the unrealized profit count against the share-
holder; so also does the realized profit which is attributable to the
collapsible property. In our prior example, the entire $100,000 profit
46. See text p. 283 supra.
47. See Reg. S 1.341-2(a) (4) (1955).
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- realized and unrealized - will count against the shareholder. Only
the shareholder gain attributable to the $1,000,000 of corporate earnings
derived from prior completed projects will be considered as noncollapsible
o48
CONCLUSION
The collapsible provision was undoubtedly enacted in order to stop
deliberate tax-avoidance plans. Its impact, however, is far wider than
that. Indeed, careful attention must be given to the possible application
of this provision whenever a corporation is to be liquidated or a significant
portion of its shares is to be sold. Particularly is this true where the
corporation has been recently engaged in operating or constructing a
relatively few large projects, as distinguished from the sale of a multitude
of relatively small inventory-type goods.
48. Reg. § 1.341-4(c) (4) (1955).
